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 This paper examines whether crowding out of intrinsic motivation by monetary 
compensation occurs in long-term care services in Japan. Empirical results show that 
crowding out appears only in non-profit organizations, but not in other organizations 
such as profit maximizing companies and public organizations. To examine causal 
effects in more detail, we perform instrumental variable probit estimation, using job 
ranks and qualifications as instrumental variables. The results are consistent with 
normal probit estimation. We find that in non-profit organizations, it is necessary to 
ensure that external motivation does not crowd out employees’ intrinsic motivation, or 





 As an important incentive for individuals, intrinsic motivation has received a lot of 
attention from economists. In general, intrinsic motivation is defined as spontaneous 
volition of individuals for some action or things. For instance, children playing 
unmindful of compensation are generally regarded as intrinsically motivated. Heckman 
& Mosso (2014) pointed out that children’s intrinsic motivation is an important 
component in generating their future human capital. Minkeler (2004) highlighted that 
intrinsic motivation enhances adult employees’ job satisfaction and their willingness to 
continue working. 
 On the other hand, in the Japanese long-term care services, the lack of human 
resources is a serious problem. As medical technology develops, Japan has become one 
of the most aged nations in the world. In 2016, the rate of population aging in Japan is 
26.7%, and it is estimated to grow further in the future1. Therefore, the long-term care 
service is an important industry in current Japan and the demand for it is expected to 
increase. 
 The problem of the lack of employees in the long-term care services, however, remains 
                                                     




as serious as ever. According to the Care Work Foundation (2015), the turnover of 
long-term care service workers in Japan is 16.5%.2 To address this turnover, the reward 
for nursing care for the elderly was increased by law in 2009 and 2013. However, there 
is no consensus about whether a wage raise decreases the turnover of long-term care 
workers. Hanaoka (2009, 2011) found that the effects of a wage raise on employee 
turnover in the long-term care service companies vary according to occupation type, and 
that in some occupations, a wage raise has no effect. On the other hand, Owa (2010) 
pointed out that stimulating spontaneous conation of long-term care service workers 
effectively curbs turnover.3 Stimulating intrinsic motivation in long-term care workers 
could hence prove useful in reducing their turnover. 
 Under some conditions, external motivation, such as monetary compensation, may 
undermine intrinsic motivation and lower the effort exerted by the individual. Previous 
studies describe this phenomenon as the “crowding out of intrinsic motivation.” 
In this paper, we first examine whether wage crowds out the intrinsic motivation of 
long-term care workers. Next, we explore why wage has a crowding out effect. In 
particular, we elucidate how workplace governance affects the crowding out of 
employees’ intrinsic motivation. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews previous 
studies and hypotheses. The data and methods are described in Section 3, and Section 4 
presents the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Literature Overview and Hypotheses 
 
2-1 Crowding Out of Intrinsic Motivation by Extrinsic Motivation 
 
 The best-known analysis of the crowding out of intrinsic motivation in economics is 
Frey (1997). According to Frey (1997), extrinsic motivation, such as money, may 
sometimes undermine workers’ intrinsic motivation. As a result, an individual will exert 
less effort in completing a task. This phenomenon is called “crowding out of intrinsic 
motivation.” 
 Let us consider 
 
                                                     
2  According to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW; 2015) of Japan, 
the average ratio of turnover in all industries in Japan is 11.3%. 
3  For a study on European care services, see Gregg, et al. (2011). 
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𝑈(𝑥, 𝑤) = 𝐵(𝑥, 𝑤) − 𝐶(𝑥, 𝑤) 
where 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑤) is the utility function of an agent, 𝑥 is the result of completing the task, 
and 𝑤 is the wage of the agent. 𝐵(𝑥, 𝑤) is the benefit function of the agent; it is a 
concave function of 𝑥 and 𝑤. 𝐶(𝑥, 𝑤) is the cost function; it is a convex function of 𝑥 










where 𝑥∗ is the optimal solution to the task that maximizes the agent’s utility, 𝐶𝑥𝑤 
indicates the price effect, and 𝐵𝑥𝑤 indicates the marginal benefit. Crowding out of 
intrinsic motivation occurs when the sign of 
𝑑𝑥∗
𝑑𝑤
 is negative; 
𝑑𝑥∗
𝑑𝑤
 depends on the sign of 
𝐵𝑥𝑤. If the sign of 𝐵𝑥𝑤 is positive, the marginal benefit is larger than the price effect, 
and extrinsic motivation does not crowd out intrinsic motivation. On the other hand, if 
the sign of 𝐵𝑥𝑤 is negative, the price effect is larger than the marginal benefit, and the 
crowding out of intrinsic motivation occurs. Therefore, monetary compensation might 
crowd out the intrinsic motivation of employees under certain conditions. 
 
2-2 Organizations, Employees, and Intrinsic Motivation 
 
 Psychology researchers found that when the right to self-determination is restricted, 
intrinsic motivation is crowded out by extrinsic motivation (Gagné and Deci: 2005). 
Moreover, in economics, it is recognized that crowding out of intrinsic motivation 
depends on the relationship between principals and agents (Bénabou and Tirole: 2003). 
Therefore, whether extrinsic motivation crowds out intrinsic motivation is considered to 
be determined by the relationships between employers and employees or by governance 
stemming from the organizational structure in the workplace. 
A distinctive feature of the market for long-term care services is its variety of 
organizational forms, comprising maximizing companies as well as non-profit 
organizations (NPOs) and public organizations. In the long-term care service industry 
in particular, there are more NPOs than in other industries. The reason is that in care 
services, NPOs have comparative advantages over profit maximizing companies. 
Consumers will trust NPOs more than profit maximizing companies because of the 
NPOs’ purpose and their restrictions on profit distribution. Accordingly, there is less 
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information asymmetry between consumers and NPOs than between consumers and 
for-profit companies (Hansmann: 1980).  
 In addition, a feature of NPOs as a workplace is that their employees tend to donate 
their labor more often than people working for profit maximizing companies. This is 
called “labor donation hypothesis” (Weisbrod: 1988). According to Besley & Ghatak 
(2005) and Serra, et al. (2011), this tendency stems from the characteristics of workers.4 
Employees’ intrinsic motivation and pro-social motivation are hence expected to become 
more salient in NPOs than in profit maximizing companies. As a result, crowding out of 
intrinsic motivation is also more noticeable in NPOs. Further, Alonso and Lewis (2001) 
found that workers in public organizations also tend to be more pro-social than workers 
in for-profit companies. Therefore, workers in public organizations are expected to 
behave similarly to workers in NPOs. 
Our hypotheses about the crowding out of intrinsic motivation in the two 
organizational forms are follows. 
 
Hypothesis 1: In NPOs, the intrinsic motivation of employees is crowded out by higher 
wage. 
 
Hypothesis 2: In public organizations, the intrinsic motivation of employees is crowded 
out by higher wage. 
 
3. Data and Method 
 
3-1 Data and Model 
 
We used data on individual workers from the Fact-Finding Survey on Long-term Care 
Work, 2010, which covers the research carried out in 2010. This research is conducted 
every year by the Care Work Foundation, entrusted with the task by the MHLW of 
Japan. The resulting data comprise two kinds of data: data on individual workers and 
data on companies. Targeted companies are chosen at random from among all care 
service companies. 5  The chosen companies then select up to three employees as 
                                                     
4 On the other hand, according to Francois (200) and Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008) 
this stems from the restriction of profit distribution. The restriction of profit 
distribution decreases the incentives of workers to freeride the labor that is donated by 
other workers. 
5 Data about all care service companies in Japan are included in the database 
WAMNET, which is maintained by the Care Work Foundation. 
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respondents who are required to answer the administered questionnaire. The 
respondents are required to return the filled-out questionnaires directly to the Care 
Work Foundation by postal mail, not through their companies. 
The Care Work Foundation database provides us with the most detailed data about 
long-term care service workers. In 2010, 17,030 companies and 51,090 employees were 
chosen to participate in the survey; 7,345 companies and 19,535 employees delivered 
valid responses. Figure 1 displays the distribution of job satisfaction among all the 
respondents. Job satisfaction was evaluated based on respondents’ answers to the 
question: “How satisfied are you with your job?” The answer options were: “1. 
Dissatisfied,” “2. A little dissatisfied,” “3. Normal,” “4. Moderately satisfied,” and “5. 
Satisfied.” The most frequently selected option was option number 3, followed by 
options number 4, 5, 2, and 1, respectively. 
In this paper, we aim to focus on intrinsically motivated employees. We thus confined 
our analysis to those employees who answered “Because I love the elderly” to the 
question “Why did you choose your current job?” We label these employees “intrinsically 
motivated employees.” Table 1 shows the answer options the question “Why did you 
choose your current job?”, how many times each option was selected, and the proportion 
in which each answer was selected. The number of respondents who answered “Because 
I love the elderly” was 5,584 out of 19,535. Figure 2 presents the distribution of job 
satisfaction among the intrinsically motivated employees only. The results for two of the 
answer options are the same as in Table 1: the least selected option is option number 1, 
and option number 2 ranks fourth. However, the most selected option is option number 
4, followed by options number 3 and 5, respectively, where the ratio of those who 
selected option number 5 exceeds 20%. These results show that the intrinsically 
motivated workers are more satisfied with their job than other workers, and compared 
to other workers, their answers are more heterogeneous. 
Another aim of this study is to analyze the differences between organizations. We thus 
divided the respondents into three subsamples according to the type of organization 
they work for. The first subsample is for-profit companies. The respondents are those 
workers who selected the option “For-profit Company” when asked about the type of 
company they work for. The second subsample is NPOs; in this case the respondents 
selected one of the following options: “Social Welfare Corporation,” “Medical 
Corporation,” “NPOs”, “Foundation or Corporation”, or “Cooperative.” The third 
subsample is public organizations, where the respondents selected the option “Local 
Government” or “Social Welfare Council.” Table 2 presents the three subsamples. In 
Table 3, we consider only intrinsically motivated employees. Figures 3, 4, and 5 present 
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the distribution of job satisfaction among employees working for for-profit companies, 
NPOs, and public organizations, respectively. The shape of the distributions in these 
figures resembles the shape of the distribution shown in Figure 2. However, option 
number 5 (“Satisfied”) is selected more frequently by employees of for-profit companies 
than by employees of NPOs and public organizations. The intrinsically motivated 
employees of for-profit companies appear to be more satisfied than employees in the 
other two types of organizations. 
We estimate the following probit model: 
 
𝐽𝑜𝑏 𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 = 𝛽1ln (𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖 + 𝛽𝐾 ∑ 𝑋𝑖=1 + 𝑢𝑖 ... (1) 
 
where 𝑖  indexes employees. The left-hand side of the equation is the dependent 
variable, employee 𝑖’s job satisfaction. This variable also indicates whether employee 𝑖 
remains intrinsically motivated. We define 𝐽𝑜𝑏 𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖  (whether employee 𝑖 
remains intrinsically motivated) based on employees’ responses as described above: 
 








^ is the job satisfaction option that employee 𝑖 selected. If employee 𝑖 selected 
option 3 (“Normal”), we regard the employee as remaining intrinsically motivated. If the 
employee selected option 2 (“A little dissatisfied”), we regard the employee unable to 
maintain intrinsic motivation6.  Table 4 shows the discrete variable and binominal 
variable of the job satisfaction of each organization. 
The main goal of this paper is to examine the statistical significance and the size and 
sign of the coefficient estimate (reflecting correlation) on the variable ln (𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖, that is, 
the first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (1) – the log-transformed wage of employee 𝑖. 
The second term in Eq. (1) is the vector of control variables, and the third item 𝑢𝑖 is the 
error term. 
The statistical significance, size, and sign of the coefficient estimate on ln (𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖 
indicate whether the hypotheses are supported or not. If the sign of 𝛽1 is negative and 
                                                     
6  We consider 𝑦𝑖
^ a proxy variable of job satisfaction for employee 𝑖, where 𝑦𝑖
∗ is the 
corresponding latent variable. Therefore, we assume that  
𝑦𝑖
^ = {
3, 4, 5 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖
∗ > 0





the coefficient is statistically significant correlates with 𝐽𝑜𝑏 𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖  in the 
subsample NPOs, Hypothesis 1 is supported. If the coefficient 𝛽1 is negative and 
statistically significant (indicating statistically significant correlation with 
𝐽𝑜𝑏 𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖) in the subsample public organizations, Hypothesis 2 is supported 
Table 5 describes the control variables. The age dummy variables begin with “Under 25” 
and increase by increments of 5 to “Over 70.”7 We include 7 occupation dummies and an 
irregular employment dummy which discerns whether employee 𝑖  works on a 
part-time basis (Clark and Oswald: 1994). As further explanatory variables, we add 
working hours as they may affect employees’ mental health (Kuroda and Yamamoto: 
2014), a gender dummy, and a region dummy which is set in Central East. We control 
for firm size with dummies indicating three levels based on the number of employees.8  
In all estimations, we use White robust normal standard errors. 
 
3-2 Instrumental Variable Probit Regression 
 
 One problem affecting the estimation of satisfaction is the reverse causality between 
wage and individuals’ job satisfaction. To address this issue, we employ the 
instrumental variable (IV) probit regression. Ishikawa (1992) pointed out that the 
tenure years and education years of workers significantly correlate with their wage but 
not with their satisfaction. Therefore, tenure and length of education years may be used 
as variables to instrument the wage variable. 
In addition, there are several important previous studies concerning employees of 
Japanese companies and long-term care services that inform our choice of instrumental 
variables. According to Tsuru et al. (2003), since 2000, wage was more affected by 
employment ranks of employees in Japanese companies than by tenure years. Zhou 
(2009) found that job qualifications are a more suitable measure of human capital of 
long-term care workers in Japan than education years. Taking the above into account, 
we use employment ranks at the organization and job qualifications as instrumental 
variables for workers’ wage. 
To analyze the effect of employment ranks in organizations and job qualifications on 
workers’ wage, we estimate the following model: 
 
                                                     
7 According to Blanchflower and Oswald (2008), when considering the age of 
individuals, job satisfaction is U-shaped curve. 
8 According to Benz and Frey (2008), the larger the number of employees in an 




ln(𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾1𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 +
𝛾3𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 +
𝛾4𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 + 𝛾5𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 ∗
𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛾6𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 ∗
𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛾7𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 ∗
𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛾8𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 ∗
𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛾𝐿 ∑ 𝑋𝑖=1 + 𝜀𝑖 … (2) 
 
The dependent variable on the left-hand side of Eq. (2) is the logarithm of wage of 
employee 𝑖. 𝛼𝑖 is the constant term and 𝜀𝑖 is the error term. 𝑋 is the vector of control 
variables and corresponds to that in Eq. (1). 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖  indicates 
whether employee 𝑖  is a middle manager. 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖  indicates whether 
employee 𝑖 works at a standard caretaker position. 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 
indicates whether employee 𝑖 is an officially qualified care worker. In the context of 
Japanese long-term care services, this qualification is esteemed as one of the most 
valuable job qualifications and qualified care workers are favored for positions in the 
industry.9  𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖  indicates whether employee 𝑖   is a 
qualified care manager. This qualification is also valued in the Japanese care industry. 
The sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth term are interaction terms between each two 
dummy variables. Table 6 describes these variables and presents selected summary 




Table 7 presents the results of probit regression considering intrinsically motivated 
employees in the whole sample. The coefficient on the logarithm of wage is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level; the marginal effect is -0.0258. This means that a 
1% increase in wage reduces the probability that an employee experiences job 
satisfaction by 2.58%. However, after including the control variables, the coefficient is 
no longer significant. The correlation between intrinsic motivation and wage is not 
robust, indicating that the crowding out of intrinsic motivation is not taking place in the 
whole sample. On the other hand, the significance of coefficients on the control variables 
                                                     
9 In this dataset, “Care Manager” is the qualification most desired by employees. The 
second most desired qualification is “Care Worker.” These qualifications are regarded 
as the optimal ones among care-related qualifications. 
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occupation dummies and age dummies is especially high. The coefficients on age 
dummies are positive, which contradicts results from previous studies. The effects of 
subjective welfare on intrinsically motivated employees seem to differ from those on 
other employees. 
The results of the estimation by subsamples are presented in Table 8. In Column 1 
(for-profit companies), the log of wage is not statistically significant. This indicates that 
the intrinsic motivation of intrinsically motivated employees in for-profit companies is 
not crowded out by wage. In Column 2 (NPOs), on the other hand, the marginal effect is 
negative, -0.0393, and the log of wage is statistically significant at 10%, with control 
variables included in the regression. This means that a 1% increase in wage reduces the 
probability that an employee experiences job satisfaction by 3.93%; the estimated 
results is robust. Therefore, in NPOs, the intrinsic motivation of intrinsically motivated 
employees seems to be crowded out by wage. The results lend support to Hypothesis 1. 
In contrast, the estimation results in Column 3 (public organizations) show a negative 
and statistically significant marginal effect. After including the control variables, the 
log of wage is not statistically significant. We find no support for Hypothesis 2. 
The results of the first-step estimation in the IV probit regression are shown in Table 9. 
The statistical significance and the sign of the coefficients on instrumental variables 
differ between subsamples. In Column 1 (the whole sample), the ordinary employee 
dummy, the care worker qualification dummy, and the care manager qualification 
dummy are statistically significant, whereas the other instrumental variables are not 
statistically significant. Furthermore, the signs of the coefficients on the ordinary 
employee dummy and on the interaction terms between the job rank dummies and the 
qualification dummies are all negative, except for the coefficients on the ordinary 
dummy and the care worker qualification dummy, which are positive. In Column 2 
(for-profit companies), the statistical significance of the instrumental variables is 
similar to the results in Column 1. In Column 3 (NPOs), the results correspond to the 
results in Column 1 and 2, except for the value of the coefficient on the ordinary 
employee dummy, which is higher than in Columns 1 and 2. In addition, the care worker 
qualification dummy is not statistically significant. We find that in private 
organizations, middle managers and top managers receive a higher compensation than 
ordinary employees, and there are wage premiums based on job qualifications. This 
tendency is stronger in for-profit companies than in NPOs. On the other hand, in 
Column 4 (public organizations), the middle manager dummy is statistically significant, 
and the interaction terms between the middle management and care worker dummies 
as well as between the ordinary dummy and the care worker dummy are statistically 
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significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. Our results suggest that job rank and 
job qualifications are not independent, and the effects among middle managers are 
more heterogeneous compared with top managers and ordinary employees. Therefore, 
the tendency for employees to be positioned and governed based on their ability is 
stronger in public organizations than in private organizations. 
Finally, Table 10 contains the results of the second-step estimation in our IV probit 
regressions. Most results differ from the results of the normal probit regressions shown 
in Table 8. The coefficient on the log of wage in Column 3 (NPOs) has the same sign as 
in Table 8. In addition, it is statistically significant at 1%. We have to note that the 
instrumental variables might be correlated with other explanatory variables. Taking 
this into consideration, our instrumental variables are plausible. Thus, we could 
consider that wage reduces the probability of the job satisfaction of employees 
increasing. Therefore, the intrinsic motivation of employees is considered to be crowded 




This study examines whether the intrinsic motivation of employees in the long-term 
care services in Japan is crowded out by wage. Our estimation results suggest that 
crowding out of intrinsic motivation occurs only in NPOs. In other types of 
organizations, such as for-profit companies and public organizations, the intrinsic 
motivation of employees is not crowded out by wage. 
The results indicate that the effects of wage differ between types of organizations. 
Thus, the forms of compensation should differ between types of organizations as well. In 
for-profit companies and public organizations, we do not observe crowding out of 
intrinsic motivation. This suggests that to motivate employees in for-profit companies to 
exert more effort, employees should be compensated based on their performance. 
The relationships between employees and consumers are important in long-term care 
services. Assessment by consumers should thus be emphasized as a determinant of 
wage. In public organizations, where caretakers’ salaries are fixed, a general increase in 
salaries might be an effective motivating factor. However, the incentives of employees as 
public agents are more complex than the incentives of employees in private 
organizations (Dixit: 2000). Therefore, monitoring by principals such as top control 
agencies should be done more carefully. 
In NPOs, types of extrinsic motivation that do not undermine intrinsic motivation 
should be considered. For instance, awards might increase employees’ intrinsic 
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motivation by stimulating their self-esteem without crowding out their intrinsic 
motivation. 
Alternatively, in order to prevent crowding out of intrinsic motivation, the 
relationships between managers and ordinary employees should be revised. Whether 
extrinsic motivation crowds out intrinsic motivation depends on the relationship 
between principals and agents. The information asymmetry between principals and 
agents causes agents not to trust their principals’ assessment. Consequently, crowding 
out of intrinsic motivation occurs. Employees of NPOs generally seem to trust each 
other more than employees of other organizations. However, compared with other types 
of organizations, trust among employees of NPO is considered more heterogeneous. 
Further, as employees of NPOs’ are sensitive to the relationships among themselves, 
little information asymmetry in NPOs may result in crowding out of employees’ 
intrinsic motivation. The issue of generating social capital at workplaces in NPOs 
should be addressed to a greater extent, especially between middle managers and top 
managers where it is needed more than between top managers and ordinary employees. 
For instance, Hotta (2010) found that opportunities for employees to talk to each other 
reduces employees’ mental stress. 
In this paper, we considered employees intrinsically motivated if they answered 
“Because I love the elderly” to the question on why they chose to work in long-term care 
services. However, it is possible to consider employees intrinsically motivated based on 
other answers (for instance, “Because I want to participate in, or contribute to 
society”). 10  To address this issue, more detailed analyses allowing for a deeper 
understanding of intrinsic motivation in employees and individuals are needed. Further, 
in the context of long-term care services, the relationships between employees and 
consumers are critical factors in shaping these organizations. The importance of 
relationships between employees and consumers warrants a more detailed examination, 
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10 Perry and Wise (1990) call it “Public Service Motivation.” 
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 We assume that the error term follows the standard normal distribution. The density 
function 𝐹(𝑥𝑖
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Question item : "Why did you select your present job?"




  "I love the elderly" 5584 28.58
Other items
  "I feel worth doing this job." 10890 55.75
  "This job will be needed at the future." 7183 36.77
  "I want to contribute to social." 6656 34.07
  "I want to participate to social." 3397 17.39
  "I experienced family care." 3383 17.32
  "My skill will be useful at this job." 6901 35.33
  "I want knowledge and skill of this job." 4679 23.95
  "I want money." 714 3.65
  "I can work as I wish." 2816 14.42
  "There are no job else I want to work." 2209 11.31
  Other reasons 822 4.21
  "I have no reason to work." 514 2.63
Observations
Table1. Question item and answer items for employment
19535
Notes: The subjects can use multiple answer items. Therefore, sum of answer ratio









Sub samples Answer items Number
  Profit Company   Profit Company 9074
Observations 9074
  Social Welfare Corporation 2835
  Medical Corporation 2557
  Non-Profit Organization (NPO) 1014
  Foundations, Corporations 943
  Cooperative 498
Observations 7847
  Public Organizations 226
  Social Welfare Council 1471
Observations 1697
Others and Not answerd, Unknowns 917
Observations
  Non Profit Organizations
  Public Organizations
19535
Table2. Organization forms of workplace
Notes: Answer items are deffined by based on corporate law of Japan. In
Japan,"Social Welfare Corporation" is deffined as private organization which
object is  increasing of social welfare. On the other hand, "Social Welfare
Council" is public organizations objects of which is same Social Welfare
Corporations. "Public Organization" is including all organizations which is







 Answer item : (Because) I love the elderly. Number
Answerd
Ratio
  Profit Companies 2862 28.68
  Non-Profit Organizations 2304 29.36
  Public Organizations 397 23.39
Observations
Table3. Number and intrinsically motivated employees by sub sumples
5563
Notes: We excluded employees who answered "Others and Not answerd, Unknowns ".















All 3.75 0.95 0.19 0.39
Sub Samples
  Profit Companies 3.84 0.93 0.20 0.40
  Non-Profit Organizations 3.67 0.96 0.18 0.38
  Public Organizations 3.67 0.92 0.18 0.38
Notes: Discrete choice is based on answer results which is decribed on Figure 2 to Figure
5. Binominal choice takes  1 value if satisfaction of employees for job takes over 2 (A











Logarithm of wage Logarithm of employees' wage 12.06 0.51
Logarithm of working hours Logarithm of employees' working hours per 1week 3.57 0.43
Female dummy Takes the value 1 if employees is female, and otherwise is 0. 0.80 0.40
Non-Regular dummy Takes the value 1 if employee is working as non-regular, and otherwise is 0. 0.30 0.46
Region dummy (Kanto) Takes the value 1 if employee lives at Kanto region, and otherwise is 0. 0.23 0.42
Occupation dummies Takes the value 1 if employees work as these occupations, and otherwise is 0.
    Helper 0.20 0.40
    In-home care worker 0.12 0.32
    Nursing staff 0.10 0.30
    Other care worker 0.58 0.49
    Life consultant 0.11 0.31
    Care manager 0.10 0.31
    Others 0.04 0.20




Age dummies Takes the value 1 if employees belong to these age class, and otherwise is 0.
    Under 24 0.08 0.27
    25-29 0.13 0.34
    30-34 0.15 0.36
    35-39 0.13 0.34
    40-44 0.12 0.32
    45-49 0.10 0.30
    50-54 0.10 0.31
    55-59 0.08 0.28
    60-64 0.06 0.24
    65-69 0.02 0.13
    Over 70 0.02 0.14
Firm size dummies Takes the value 1 if firm has these employees, and otherwise is 0.
    Under 99 0.29 0.46
    100-299 0.14 0.34
    300-499 0.04 0.18
    Over 500 0.08 0.27






Definition Sub samples Mean
Standard
Diviation
  Middle management dummy Takes 1 value if employees are middle management position, and otherwise is 0. 0.23 0.43
Profit Companies 0.22 0.41
Non-Profit Orgamnizations 0.26 0.44
Public Organizations 0.18 0.39
  Ordinaly dummy Takes 1 value if employees are ordinaly position, and otherwise is 0. 0.59 0.49
Profit Companies 0.56 0.50
Non-Profit Orgamnizations 0.60 0.49
Public Organizations 0.69 0.46
  Care worker qualification dummy Takes 1 value if employees have care worker qualification, and otherwise is 0. 0.50 0.50
Profit Companies 0.44 0.50
Non-Profit Orgamnizations 0.58 0.49
Public Organizations 0.54 0.50
  Care manager qualification dummy Takes 1 value if employees have care manager qualification, and otherwise is 0. 0.16 0.37
Profit Companies 0.14 0.35
Non-Profit Orgamnizations 0.19 0.39
Public Organizations 0.17 0.38






Std. Err. Std. Err.
  Logarithm of wage -0.0258 ** [0.04] -0.0028 [0.06]
  Working hours -0.0479 *** [0.06]
  Woman dummy -0.0152 [0.06]
  Non-Regular dummy 0.0160 [0.06]
  Region dummy (Kanto) 0.0296 ** [0.05]
  Occupation dummies
    Helper 0.0009 [0.07]
    In-home care worker 0.0509 *** [0.07]
    Nursing staff 0.0106 [0.08]
    Other care worker -0.0386 ** [0.06]
    Life consultant 0.0526 *** [0.07]
    Care manager 0.0828 *** [0.08]
    Others 0.0756 *** [0.10]
  Age dummies
    Under 24
    25-29 0.0059 [0.12]
    30-34 0.0308 [0.11]
    35-39 0.0368 [0.11]
    40-44 0.0443 [0.11]
    45-49 0.1093 *** [0.11]
    50-54 0.1203 *** [0.11]
    55-59 0.1356 *** [0.11]
    60-64 0.1635 *** [0.12]
    65-69 0.2894 *** [0.12]
    Over 70 0.1417 *** [0.17]
  Firm size dummies
    Under 99
    100-299 -0.0334 ** [0.07]
    300-499 -0.0498 [0.13]

























Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff.
Notes : The sample  consists of  employees who answerd "(Because) I love old the elderly" to the question "Why did
you select your present job" as Table 1. Control variables are discribed on Table 5. Dependent variable is binominal
variable whether employee is satisfied for his job or not described on Table 4. Numbers in parentheses are robust



















Std. Err. Std. Err. Std. Err.
  Logarithm of wage 0.0270 [0.08] -0.0393 * [0.10] 0.0058 [0.24]




Table8. Results of Probit Regression : Determinants of Job Satisfaction (Sub samples)
114.46 23.80
All All
Dependent Variables : Job Satisfaction
All
(2) Non Profit Organizations
170.21
(1) Profit Companies (3) Public Organizations




Notes : The sample  consists of  employees who answerd "(Because) I love the elderly" to the question "Why did you select your present job", and equivalent to sub samples by
organization forms of workplace as Table 3.  Dependent variable is binomical variable whether employees is satisfied for his job or not described on Table 4. Numbers in
parentheses are robust standart errors. * suggests statistical significance at the 10 % levels, respectively. Control variables are equivalent to Table 7. However, estimation of
control variables are not reported.
0.0959
2052
Std. Err. Std. Err. Std. Err. Std. Err.
  Middle management dummy 0.0275 [0.03] 0.0130 [0.04] 0.0030 [0.04] 0.4480 *** [0.10]
  Ordinaly dummy -0.0891 *** [0.03] -0.0675 * [0.03] -0.1310 *** [0.03] 0.0498 [0.09]
  Care worker qualification dummy 0.0751 ** [0.03] 0.0782 * [0.04] 0.0228 [0.04] 0.3923 *** [0.10]
  Care manager qualification dummy 0.1297 *** [0.03] 0.1669 *** [0.05] 0.0904 * [0.05] 0.2535 [0.11]
  Middle*Care worker -0.0235 [0.04] -0.0375 [0.05] 0.0334 [0.05] -0.4955 *** [0.13]
  Middle*Care manager -0.0448 [0.04] -0.0902 [0.08] -0.0388 [0.06] -0.0996 [0.19]
  Ordinaly*Care worker 0.0087 [0.03] -0.0381 [0.05] 0.0758 [0.05] -0.2583 ** [0.12]
  Ordinaly*Care Manager -0.0544 [0.04] -0.0833 [0.06] -0.0224 [0.06] -0.2157 [0.10]
  Control variables
Wald Test of Exogeneity : Chi squire [p =0.11] [p =0.47] [p =0.18] [p =0.99]
F test : Chi squire [p =0.00] [p =0.00] [p =0.00] [p =0.00]
Observations 337
Notes : The sample  consists of  employees who answerd "(Because) I love the elderly" to the question "Why did you select your present job", and equivalent to sub samples by organization forms of workplace as
Table 3.  Dependent variable is logarithm of wage of employees. Numbers in parentheses are robust standart errors. *** and **, * suggest statistical significance at the 1 % and 5%, 10 % levels, respectively. Control
variables are equivalent to Table 7 and Table 8.  However, estimation of control variables are not reported.
Table9. Results of IV Probit Regression : First Step Estimation (Determinants of Logarithm of wage)
All














Std. Err. Std. Err. Std. Err. Std. Err.
  Logarithm of wage -0.6236 * [0.38] -0.3867 [0.66] -0.9686 * [0.56] 0.0106 [0.84]




Table10. Results of IV Probit Regression :  Second Step Estimation (Determinants of Job Satisfaction)
All All
(2) Profit Companies (4) Public Organizations







Notes : The sample  consists of employees who answerd "(Because) I love the elderly" to the question "Why did you select your present job", equivalent to  samples by organization forms of workplace as Table 3.
Dependent variable is binominal variable whether employees is satisfied for his job or not described on Table 4. Numbers in parentheses are robust standart errors. * suggests statistical significance at the 10 % level,
respectively. Control variables are equivalent to Table 7 and Table 8 and Table 9. However, estimation of control variables are not reported.
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(1) Whole sample (3) Non-Profit Organizations
-4019.68 -2089.82
4700 2293 2052
